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It is now widely accepted that ‘transparency’ in the conduct of monetary policy improves policy 
outcomes.
1 The reasons for this have been widely explored (see e.g. Chortareas, et al, 2003) and it is clear 
that the range of benefits is partly due to the range of meanings which can be given to the term transparency 
(Geraats, 2000). For the purposes of this paper, the evidence of transparency with which we are 
concerned (a) defines a transparent policy as one where agents can anticipate CB decisions and 
thus (b) sees the advantage primarily in preventing policy decisions themselves being a source of 
destabilising shocks to the economy. This is essentially the position taken by the Bank of England 
and lay behind Mervyn King’s (1997) famous remark that the hallmark of a well-conducted 
monetary policy is that it should be ‘boring’. The ‘news’ should be in the behaviour of 
macroeconomic variables and not in the central bank’s subsequent reaction to them.  Notice that 
this amounts to an ambition whereby agents will know (a) the structure of the central bank’s 
reaction function, (b) the size of the coefficients, (c) the value of the macro-variables to which 
these coefficients apply and therefore (d) the way in which those macro-variables are likely to be 
influenced by any change in the official rate of interest. 
  The first publication to confirm the importance placed by central banks on the transparency 
of their actions was the study by Fry et al. (2000) which showed that some 74 per cent of banks 
claimed to promote the openness of their policy making. Since then, there have been numerous 
studies which attempt to measure the actual (or perceived) transparency of individual regimes. 
Such studies fall into three broad categories. Firstly, there are those which, following the central 
bank independence literature of some fifteen years ago, ranking central banks according to their 
demonstration of institutional characteristics deemed a priori to contribute to transparency (for 
example, Fry et al, 2000; Eijffinger and Geraats, 2002; De Haan and Amtenbrink, 2002). 
Secondly, there are surveys of market opinion (for example, Goldman Sachs (2000), Waller and 
De Haan (2004) and Reuters (recurrently)). Thirdly, there are tests of practitioners’ ability to 
                                                 
1 But see Thornton (2003) for some critical observations.   3 
anticipate the decision of the policymaker. These focus upon movements in short-term money 
market rates surrounding the date of an interest rate decision and we turn to these in a moment. 
  What is apparent from the ‘characteristics’ and the survey evidence is that the ECB does 
not rank consistently highly, in spite of its constitution being drawn up in a period when 
transparency was at least beginning to become fashionable. Also apparent, but less surprising, 
since it was famously secretive (Thornton, 2003), is that its predecessor, the Deutsche Bundesbank 
generally ranks low in the league tables.  The position of the ECB in these rankings tends if 
anything to confirm the allegations made by Buiter in the famous Buiter-Issing (1999) debate, 
based on the characteristics approach, and pointing to the lack of an inflation report and minutes or 
voting records of meetings as being unhelpful to agents.  
  What is more surprising than the moderate ranking of the ECB and Bundesbank on 
characteristics is the fact that both score highly in the third group of studies, based on what we 
shall call market-evidence. Relevant studies here include Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002); Coppell 
and Connolly (2003); Haldane and Read (2000); Hardy (1998); Perez-Quiros and Sicilia  (2002)  
Ross (2002) and Wadhwani (2001). These are invariably comparative studies and (although 
countries in the comparisons vary) what generally emerges is that money market practitioners 
found it no more difficult to anticipate the interest rate decisions of the Bundesbank, or later the 
ECB, than they do, say, the actions of the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve. Writing in the 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin in 2001, Wadwhani reported that ‘The results of this exercise 
[covering the period 1997-2001] suggest that the average market ‘surprise’ on the day of an 
interest rate decision has been higher in the UK compared with the United States and Europe’ 
(Wadwhani, 2001, p.355). Coppell and Connolly (2003) looked at market anticipation in Australia 
and compared it with other regimes including the USA, UK, Canada and Germany. The data 
covered the period 1996 to 2002 (and thus for Germany covered a period of both Bundesbank and 
ECB policy-making). They found ‘…it [was] not possible to reject the hypothesis that the level of 
anticipation by the markets of a rate move in each country [was] equal’. 
  It is perhaps not altogether surprising that the results from the ‘characteristics’ approach 
and from market interest rates should differ. Listing rather arbitrary characteristics and attaching 
(even more) arbitrary weights to them received a critical press at the time of the independence 
investigations and the results deserve to be treated with caution. What is more remarkable is that 
the practitioners whose actions in money markets appear to confirm that they can ‘read’ the ECB 
and (could read the) Bundesbank tolerably well, are substantially the same agents who report 
themselves as uncertain or confused by the ECB and Bundesbank behaviour in the surveys. In this 
paper we try to shed some light on this apparent paradox.   4 
  We do this by making use of additional information provided in cross sectional data, which 
allow us to examine the dispersion of views amongst agents when they predict future relevant 
variables.
2 As quoted in previous paragraphs, there is overwhelming evidence that on average 
agents anticipate Bank of England policy no better than Bundesbank or ECB policy. However, 
transparency should not only reduce the size of average policy surprises, but greater benefits from 
transparency should also be apparent in a narrowing of the diversity in cross sectional forecasts. 
This paper is concerned with answering the following questions: (i) Has the spread of market rate 
forecasts changed over time and does it vary under different regimes? If transparency reduces 
uncertainty, then we would expect a greater decline in the dispersion of forecasts under the Bank 
of England than under the ECB regime. (ii) Has the forecast spread of key macro variables 
changed in Germany and the UK and if so has it changed in different directions? The dispersion 
across forecasts may have changed because the economy is more stable and thus easier to forecast. 
For example, since macroeconomic forecasts enter the reaction function of the central bank, an 
increased convergence of view about the future path of interest rates may be due more to greater 
certainty about future economic developments than to greater transparency. (iii) Is the change in 
forecast diversity an important variable in explaining the dispersion of forecasts regarding money 
market developments? 
  Since the observation that agents’ behaviour in money markets is at odds with their 
reported perceptions in surveys and with what one might expect from regime characteristics, we 
test in section 2 the hypothesis that while agents anticipations in aggregate may be broadly 
correct, underlying this ‘average’ outcome there may have been an increasing dispersion  of 
individual views about the next movement in interest rates. In section 3, we look at why this might 
be the case, by looking at agents’ views about the two key variables in the central bank’s reaction 
function, namely the rate of inflation and the trend in output. In section 4 we summarize and 
conclude. 
 
2. Money market rate uncertainty 
Our thinking here is that while, on average (or in the aggregate), agents’ anticipation may not have 
changed, or even may have improved, it is perfectly possible for this to be accompanied at the 
same time by increasing uncertainty on the part of individual agents. What the results may be 
telling us about average behaviour, may be concealing a change in the degree of unanimity across 
agents.  A greater dispersion of view would in turn indicate greater insecurity vis-à-vis monetary 
                                                 
2 The only other study we are aware of which also uses cross-sectional data to analyse the potential benefits of 
transparency is Swanson (2004) for the USA.    5 
policy which would not show up in the estimations of average central bank policy anticipation but 
would be reflected in agents own perception of the difficulty of forming a judgement. In the case 
of Germany, it may also shed some light on the difference between results from money markets 
which find policy anticipation high and the characteristics and survey evidence which find it low.         
In order to measure the degree of unanimity with which private agents anticipate interest 
rate changes by the central bank over time, we looked at the range and standard deviation of 
forecasts by private institutions as reported in Consensus Forecasts. Every month, this publication 
shows the forecasts for, inter alia, the 3-month euro-DM interest rate (i.e. the rate on 3-month 
deposits in euros in Germany) and the 3-month interbank rate for the UK for some 25 private 
sector institutions (although this number of institutions reporting forecasts varies somewhat during 
the year). The forecasts are in both cases for 3 and 12 months ahead. We use two measures of 
volatility: the standard deviation of the forecasts of the private agents as reported in Consensus 
Forecasts, and we calculated the range for the third highest and third lowest forecasts (which is 
about the 12
th and 88
th percentile of the distribution) and compared them over time. Any changes 
in the cross-sectional distribution of forecasts are interpreted as a change in uncertainty with which 
individual private agents forecast central bank policy. The sample period is from January 1994 
until May 2004.
3 Table 1 presents basic summary statistics on the forecasting dispersion data. 
 
Table 1: 
Descriptive statistics of interest rate forecast dispersions under BoE and BB/ECB regimes 
 
Variable/Statistic  mean  median  min  max  SD 
3mRange(BB/ECB)  0.368  0.4  0.1  0.7  0.13 
3mRange(BoE)  0.492  0.5  0.1  0.9  0.17 
3mSD(BB/ECB)  0.163  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.05 
3mSD(BoE)  0.217  0.2  0.1  0.3  0.06 
AnnualRange(BB/ECB)  0.758  0.7  0.3  1.4  0.25 
AnnualRange(BoE)  1.219  1.2  0.5  2.5  0.4 
annualSD(BB/ECB)  0.317  0.3  0.2  0.7  0.1 
annualSD(BoE)  0.504  0.5  0.3  0.9  0.14 
 
                                                 
3 Due to the lack of data, we cannot distinguish between pre- and post inflation targeting for the UK. We tried to test 
for a break in anticipation due to Bank of England independence. However, we could not find a significant break 
(Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells, 2007).   6 
In all cases, average forecast dispersion is lower and median dispersion is either equal or lower 
under Bundesbank/ECB than under the Bank of England. Throughout, the variation of the forecast 
dispersion (standard deviation or SD) is higher under Bank of England than under 
Bundesbank/ECB. Apparently, agents are on average less uncertain with respect to 
Bundesbank/ECB monetary policy than they are with Bank of England policy. Also, average 
variation of uncertainty seems to be higher under the Bank of England regime. These preliminary 
results suggest that agents should feel more confident about Bundesbank/ECB than Bank of 
England policy. Recalling that our aim is to shed some light on the contradictory evidence of 
agents’ perception on monetary policy transparency of the two banks and their ability of 
anticipating equally well under both regimes, these preliminary descriptive results indicate that 
agents should also perceive Bundesbank/ECB as more transparent than Bank of England. 
However, agents’ perception on monetary transparency may be more importantly determined by 
how their forecasting uncertainty changes over time.  
We turn to this issue next by trying to find out how the distribution of forecast views has 
changed over time, since attempts to improve agents’ understanding of policy decisions have been 
to some extent incremental.
4 Thus we estimate for both countries the trend behaviour of this 
variation by the following equation: 
2
, , ( ) (1) t i i i t i i i t Dispersion L dispersion Trend Trend e α β τ ϕ = + + + +  
The dependent variable dispersion stands for the forecast range or the forecast standard deviation 
and the subscript i distinguishes between the quarterly and one-year ahead forecasts. Thus, the 
range of views about future interest rate developments is measured in four ways: (1) by the 3-
month-ahead and (2) the 1-year ahead forecasting range of the short-term money market rate, 
denoted by 3mRange and annualRange, respectively, as well as by (3) the 3-month-ahead forecast 
standard deviation (3mSD) and (4) the 1-year-ahead forecast standard deviation (annualSD). The 
lagged dependent variable was included to reduce serial correlation.  
  Equation (1) models a non-linear relationship of forecast dispersions across time. This 
curvilinear trend model allows a levelling off or accelerating of the change in uncertainty. If, over 
time, agents find it easier (harder) to forecast, forecasting uncertainty declines (increases) over 
time and we expect a negative (positive) coefficient ( i τ ) on the trend variable. Forecasting 
                                                 
4 For example, while the march towards openness begins famously with inflation targeting and the publication of the 
Inflation Report in November 1992, 1994 saw the introduction of a regular schedule of meetings between the 
Chancellor and Governor and the publication of minutes of their meetings. May 1997 saw the Bank of England given 
operational independence and a shortening in the lag between decision meetings and the publication of minutes. 
Wadhwani (2001) argues that 1999 marks another significant date since by then agents have had sufficient time to 
‘learn’ how the MPC works. 
   7 
uncertainty may show (a) a decelerating positive slope ( 0, 0 i i τ ϕ > < ), (b) an accelerating positive 
slope ( 0, 0 i i τ ϕ > > ), (c) a decelerating negative slope ( 0, 0 i i τ ϕ < > ), or (d) an accelerating 
negative slope ( 0, 0 i i τ ϕ < < ).  
The curvilinear trend model is a useful tool to test how the changes in the conduct of 
monetary policy have affected agents’ confidence over time. If the increase in transparency 
enhanced agents’ understanding and confidence, we would expect that uncertainty fell over time 
( 0) i τ p . To any achievements in policymaking, the passage of time is inevitably relevant since, 
for any given regime, time enables agents to learn by experience. Whadhwani (2001, p.355) 
suggests that agents’ required two years (1997-99) to ‘learn’ about the reactions of the MPC.  And 
it is a general theme of Thornton (2003) that what really improves policy outcomes is the stability 
of regime combined with consistent behaviour. In these circumstances, time alone will ensure that 
agents understand how the monetary authority behaves, without any of the currently fashionable 
‘transparency characteristics’.  If learning is important, it may even be that over time, agents’ 
uncertainty falls more rapidly ( 0, 0) i i τ ϕ p p . 
  We turn to the empirical results and begin with those for Germany first (see Table 2 
below)
5. As in the case of the Bank of England, we also expect a negative trend coefficient and, if 
agents’ forecast uncertainty falls more rapidly over time, the parameter  i ϕ  should also be negative, 
if the Bundesbank/ECB were better understood by market participants over time.  Particularly at 
the early period of the ECB, market participants seemed surprised about either ECB’s policy move 
or the lack of it, as for instance repeatedly reported by the Financial Times. Thus, an additional 
interesting hypothesis to test for the Bundesbank/ECB regime is whether agents may have become 
more uncertain about their monetary policy predictions in the later, the ECB period. If the 
hypothesis were correct that ECB policy has increased agents’ forecasting uncertainty, we would 
expect the following estimation results of equation (1): Either, if  i τ  were negative over the entire 
sample period (implying that over time agents have become more confident in forecasting 
monetary policy) and  i ϕ should be positive so that the falling trend flattens out as time goes on 
(‘getting better but more slowly’); or, if  i τ   were positive, then  i ϕ  should also be positive, 
indicating an accelerating rise in private agents’ forecasting uncertainty (‘getting worse and more 
quickly’).  
                                                 
5 All estimations that involve model (1) use orthogonal trends in order to avoid correlation between the explanatory 
trend variables.   8 
  The estimation results of short-term forecast uncertainty (3mRange(BB/ECB)and 
3mSD(BB/ECB)) indicate that neither of the uncertainty measures changes over time. Not only 
has the regime switch from Bundesbank to ECB not affected average monetary policy anticipation 
(see for instance Ross, 2002; Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal and Howells, 2006; Coppell and 
Connolly, 2003; to mention a few), it also did not affect agents’ short-term forecasting unanimity. 
The picture is somewhat different when we look at the results of annual forecasting uncertainty 
(annualRange(BB/ECB) and annualSD(BB/ECB)). Throughout the sample period, agents’ forecast 
dispersion has increased, but also here, there is no sign of rising uncertainty under the ECB 
compared to the Bundesbank regime.  
  The short-term forecast dispersion results under the Bank of England (3mRange(BoE) and 
3mSD(BoE)), show that agents’ confidence has increased over time ( 0) i τ < , which may be 
attributed to the incremental increase in Bank of England monetary transparency. Even though, 
market participants’ learning and central bank’s need to establishing monetary policy credibility   
may be important, there is no evidence here over this sample period ( 0) i ϕ = . 
6 The results on 
annual forecasting uncertainty (annualRange(BoE) and annualSD(BoE))are more difficult to 
interpret in relation to our discussion so far. The downward trend in uncertainty is reversed by 















                                                 
6 We pointed out earlier that the sample begins in 1994. As shown in Haldane and Read (2000) and also in Biefang-
Frisancho Mariscal and Howells (2007), market agents’ policy anticipation improved significantly since inflation 
targeting was introduced in 1992. This may imply that the learning process was at an end by 1994  and is therefore not 
picked up by our estimations.    9 
Table 2:  
Quarterly and annual forecasting volatility of money market rates under BB/ECB and BoE  
 
Variable  i α   i β   i τ   i ϕ  
2 R  
2 [ ] R  
LM(2) 
































































































Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are calculated on the basis of Newy-
West adjusted variances and covariances. LM(2) is the Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation of 
order 2.  In square brackets in the last column are the probability levels ‘*’ indicate that coefficients or tests 
are significant at the 5% level of less. 
 
Taking the results together and including those of Table 1, we find that even though 
agents’ average uncertainty has been comparatively lower under Bundesbank/ECB regime, the 
absence of the decline in short-term forecasting uncertainty (in comparison to agents facing Bank 
of England monetary policy) may, at least to some degree, be responsible for why the Bank of 
England is perceived as being more predictable. Also, the continuous rise in long-term forecast 
uncertainty under Bundesbank/ECB and the at least initial fall in uncertainty under the Bank of 
England, may explain agents’ perception on the difference in transparency of both banks. 
 
3 Explaining short-term interest rate uncertainty   10 
The change in uncertainty over forecasting market interest rates in both countries over time could 
have a number of possible explanations. However, if there is a consensus that deviations of current 
from target inflation and changes in the output gap are important inputs into central bank reaction 
functions, then one obvious hypothesis that we must test is that agents have become more (or less) 
certain in their inflation and GDP forecasts too. Thinking in terms of a reaction function, the point 
here is that while agents may be reasonably knowledgeable about the magnitude of the 
coefficients, they may become more or less certain about the magnitudes to which the coefficients 
apply. In other words, even if the central bank reaction function is well understood and known, it 
is possible that agents find it difficult to forecast relevant macroeconomic variables. If this is the 
case, then even for given and ‘known’ coefficients in the reaction function, the forecasting 
uncertainty of money market rates varies with the forecasting uncertainty of, say, the inflation rate 
or the relationship of output to trend.
7 The uncertainty about future inflation (or economic growth), 
will then show up in a greater spread of the forecasts of money market rates.  
  Agents’ uncertainty about macroeconomic development may change either because the 
economy moves away from a more stable state, or there is a turn in the business cycle, or the 
economy experiences shocks, to give just a few examples. Also the establishment of new, major 
institutions may initially cause greater uncertainty for agents until these institutions have been 
established for some years or so.
8 
The latter may be particularly relevant for the estimations under Bundesbank/ECB. EMU 
has been a new phenomenon and in this section we want to analyse whether agents found it more 
difficult in these circumstances to predict macroeconomic variables as inflation and GDP growth.  
Particularly at the beginning of EMU, it may be more difficult for agents to predict the 
macroeconomy of individual countries in the new area given the uncertainty over the true degree 
of convergence of individual economies and how they would react to the ‘one-size-fits-all’ level of 
interest rates. Since the prediction of central bank policy moves depends to some extent on agents 
being able to forecast movements in the variables entering the bank’s reaction function, then 
increasing difficulty in forecasting these variables would make agents less confident in their 
anticipation of policy moves, especially since there is feedback to these variables from the 
authorities’ policy decisions and since because of the new regime the nature of the feedback has 
                                                 
7 Mervyn King might be right that in an ideal policy world the ‘news’ would be in the movement of the 
macroeconomic variables but if that news is hard to extract, monetary policy could still have its exciting moments. 
8 See again Wadhwani (2002, p.355). Also, Bean (2005 pp.86-88) for example, in commenting upon the greater 
economic stability with which policymakers have been confronted in recent years, suggests that part of the explanation 
is an improvement in policymaking itself. This suggests a sort of virtuous circle whereby (we can begin anywhere) 
improved policymaking improves stability which makes it easier for agents to anticipate the path of macro-variables 
and the reaction of the authorities for whom policymaking then becomes easier.   11 
become uncertain. Furthermore, this injection of uncertainty into the way in which current interest 
rate decisions affect the future path of relevant macro variables will increase with the forecast 
horizon. Current interest rate decisions may have little effect on relevant magnitudes three months 
hence, but will very likely have some impact in a year’s time.  
In the following sections, we estimate agents’ uncertainty regarding inflation and GDP 
growth.
9 Finally, we test whether inflation uncertainty explains uncertainty in market interest rates. 
For both countries, we use monthly data for inflation and real GDP growth, each predicted 
one year ahead (only). Again, we calculate the forecast range and use the reported standard 
deviation to measure macroeconomic forecast uncertainty. For the UK, the sample period is from 
January 1994 until May 2004. For Germany, the sample period for the one-year-ahead inflation 
forecast range is from January 1994 until May 2004 and for the one-year-ahead GDP growth range 
it is from June 1994 until May 2004.  Forecasts for GDP growth refer to unified Germany 
throughout. Inflation forecasts are reported for West Germany until September 1997, only. Table 3 
shows the basic descriptive statistics of the data. 
Table 3:  
Descriptive statistics of macro variable dispersions under BoE and BB/ECB regimes 
 
  mean  median  min  max  SD 
Inflationrange(G)  0.653  0.6  0.3  1.3  0.19 
Inflationrange(UK)  1.095  0.8  0.4  3.3  0.67 
InflationSD(G)  0.270  0.3  0.1  0.5  0.08 
InflationSD(UK)  0.423  0.3  0.2  1.2  0.21 
GDPRange(G)  0.804  0.8  0.4  1.5  0.2 
GDPRange(UK)  1.094  1.1  0.4  1.8  0.35 
GDPSD(G)  0.329  0.3  0.2  0.6  0.08 
GDPSD(UK)  0.470  0.5  0.2  0.8  0.13 
 
In all cases (except for one), average forecast dispersions (mean and median) of the two 
macroeconomic variables are lower under Bundesbank/ECB. Also, average variation and range of 
forecast dispersion are higher under the Bank of England regime, so that overall, macroeconomic 
uncertainty is on average higher in the UK than in Germany. The lower macroeconomic average 
forecasting uncertainty in Germany may have been favourable to a tendency for lower interest 
forecasting uncertainty than otherwise. Likewise, the higher average macroeconomic forecasting 
                                                 
9 The source is as before various issues of Consensus Forecasting.   12 
uncertainty for the UK may have overshadowed some of the effects of greater transparency efforts 
intended by the Bank of England.  
  As before, we test for the degree of forecast uncertainty over time in order to be able to 
relate the results of the behaviour of the macroeconomic forecasting dispersion over time to that of 
the interest rate forecasting dispersion. We use equation (1) above, replacing the dependent 
variable therein by the one-year-ahead inflation and one-year-ahead real GDP growth forecasting 
range or standard deviation, respectively.
10   
The results of the estimations of equation (1) are shown in Table 4 below: 
Table 4: Quarterly and annual forecasting volatility of the inflation rate and GDP growth 
under BB/ECB and BoE, based on modified equation (1) 
Variable  i α   i β   i τ   i ϕ  
2 R  
[
2 R ] 
LM(2) 
































































































Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are calculated on the basis of 
Newy-West adjusted variances and covariances. LM(2) is the Lagrange multiplier test for serial 
correlation of order 2.  In the last column in square brackets are the probability levels ‘*’ indicate that 
coefficients and tests are significant at the 5% level of less. 
 
                                                 
10 In the German case, we included a further dummy to account for a change in the reporting of the inflation data from 
West Germany to Germany. It was insignificant and is not reported here.   13 
We first turn to the results of GDP growth forecast dispersion in both countries: in the 
German case, there is no evidence that GDP growth forecasting uncertainty changes over time. 
Contrary to this, there is, on balance an upward trend in UK forecasting uncertainty, albeit with an 
initial fall at the beginning of the sample period. More illuminating are the results on inflation 
forecast dispersion. The German estimation results show that inflation forecast dispersion rises 
throughout the sample period, at an accelerating speed. The latter may indicate that the switch to 
the EMU has increased agents uncertainty over inflation. Also, the behaviour of inflation forecast 
dispersion matches in direction (although not in intensity) with the continuous rise in long-run 
interest forecast dispersion as shown in Table 2. For the UK the results are different. Initially, there 
is a fall in inflation forecast dispersion, a trend, which is reversed in the first half of 1996. This is 
at approximately the same time as we found a rise in interbank rate uncertainty in the UK. For 
both, the UK and Germany, therefore, there does appear to be some association between increasing 
uncertainty about future interest rates and increasing uncertainty about the future path of inflation. 
The second part of this section is concerned with testing for the effect of inflation 
uncertainty on market rate uncertainty.  For both countries, we only replace the trends in the 
regression equations by volatility of inflation and the dependent variables are the one-year-ahead 
interest rate forecast dispersions. Table 5 below presents the results. 
Table 5: Annual forecasting range and standard deviation of the money market rates and 
inflation volatility for Germany and the UK  
 
Variable  i α   i β   1 c  
2 R  
[
2 R ] 
LM(2) 








































Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are 
calculated on the basis of Newy-West adjusted variances and covariances. 
LM(2) is the Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation of order 2.  In square 
brackets are the probability levels ‘*’ indicate that coefficients are significant at 
the 5% level of less. The coefficient  1 c  refers to the variable inflation forecast 
volatility. 
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There is no evidence for Germany that one-year-ahead euro-DM uncertainty is affected by 
dispersion of views about inflation. This result is perhaps not that surprising. Policy rates are set 
by the ECB and the relevant inflation rate for ECB policy purposes is based on the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area.
11 In other words, we may be looking at the ‘wrong’ 
inflation rate. However, when we estimated over the shorter period, before EMU, the range of 
inflation forecasts was not a significant explanatory variable for interest rate forecast dispersion. 
We therefore may conclude that the rise in money market uncertainty may be due to the regime 
change and with it agents’ difficulty to confidently forecast ECB policy.  
For the UK, the results are clear: inflation uncertainty increases the uncertainty of one-
year-ahead forecasts of interest rates. In other words, the rise in inflation uncertainty (see Table 4) 
increases monetary policy uncertainty. The interesting question is why should this uncertainty 
have surfaced in 1996. One year later and one might have pointed to the independence of the Bank 
of England and a partially new operating regime, but this came generally as a surprise and so it is 
difficult to argue that the uncertainty reflects an expectation of a regime change. 
Some evidence is provided in the Bank of England’s Inflation Reports for 1996. In each 
quarterly issue, section 6 discusses ‘prospects for inflation’. This discussion centres around the 
famous fan charts showing the forecast path of inflation as a probability distribution. It is clear 
from a comparison of the charts from one issue to the next that the ‘fan’ becomes more dispersed. 
This increase in the uncertainty of its own forecasts is acknowledged by the Bank in the November 
Report (Bank, 1996b p.44).  Moreover, beginning in February 1996, section 6 of the Report 
included a subsection titled ‘other inflation projections’ wherein the Bank commented on other 
forecasters’ projections, both as regards their median values and the dispersion. In the August 
issue the Bank comments:  ‘Unusually, the spread of views for 1997Q4 has not narrowed…the 
interquartile range has widened slightly to 2.5%-3.3%’ (Bank, 1996a, p.46). The term ‘unusually’ 
is used because the Bank is referring specifically to the behaviour of one year ahead forecasts; the 
increased dispersion of view is absent at shorter horizons. 
In so far as an explanation is offered, it centres on the behaviour of the exchange rate, 
which had become very volatile, appreciating by 8 per cent between the August and November 
Reports alone (Bank, 1996b pp. 41, 45). It is interesting to note that the standard deviation of 
monthly data for the sterling effective exchange rate between the introduction of inflation targeting 
in November 1992 and the middle of 1996 is just 1.8; from late 1996 to the end of 2000, a period 
of roughly comparable length, the standard deviation is 8.05.
12  It is hard to escape the conclusion 
                                                 
11 Consensus Forecasts has published euro area statistics only since January 2003. 
12 Calculated from the series XUMABK on the Bank of England’s database.   15 
that agents had become familiar with the Bank’s post-inflation targeting reaction function and its 
coefficients, and had become reasonably confident in handling the feedback from interest rate 
decisions to the inflation and output inputs, all in a period of relative exchange rate stability. This 
ends quite suddenly in 1996. From then on, it becomes much more difficult to forecast the future 
path of inflation, at least at horizons like a year or more, and thus of the Bank’s likely reaction at 
similar horizons. Such uncertainty may or may not have been supplemented by the reforms in May 
1997, but it was already well-established by then. 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
If agents find it easier to anticipate future central bank policy moves, it is not only expected that, 
on average, the policy surprise on the day of the policy announcement declines, but we should also 
expect that the cross sectional distribution of interest rate forecast dispersion becomes narrower.  
Cross sectional forecast dispersion are used as additional evidence to shed some light on 
the apparent divergence in agents’ perception and ability to predict both, Bundesbank/ECB and 
Bank of England policy rate changes. If Bundesbank/ECB policy were more difficult to predict 
than Bank of England’s, we expect a greater dispersion of interest rate forecasts of the former than 
the latter. The estimation results show that there is an obvious decline in agents’ (short-term) 
interest forecast uncertainty under the Bank of England regime, while nothing has changed under 
the Bundesbank/ECB. Furthermore, under Bundesbank/ECB, long-term forecast uncertainty has 
risen throughout the sample period, while under Bank of England a declining trend has been 
reversed. Taking the results together, interest forecast uncertainty has fallen more under BoE than 
under BB/ECB.  
The fall (lack of change) in (short-term) interest forecast uncertainty and the eventual rise 
(the continuous rise) in (long-term) forecast uncertainty under Band of England and 
Bundesbank/ECB, respectively, may be due to changes in inflation and GDP growth forecast 
uncertainty. Interest rate forecast uncertainty may rise (fall) due to a rise (fall) macroeconomic 
uncertainty. For instance, if macroeconomic uncertainty has risen, this may explain for why the 
fall in interest forecast uncertainty was either lower than one might expect or was actually rising. 
We find for Germany no obvious change in GDP growth forecast dispersion, while there is on 
balance, in the UK, a rising tend (albeit falling in the first half of the sample period.  Inflation 
uncertainty has been rising over the entire sample period for Germany, while the UK shows a spell 
of a fall that is later on reversed. The similarity of the movement of long-term interest and inflation 
forecast dispersions in both countries suggested that inflation and interest rate forecast uncertainty   16 
may be related to each other. It was tested whether the change in inflation forecast dispersion 
explained long-term interest rate forecast dispersion. It was found that this is only so for the UK, 
where higher inflation uncertainty explains greater interest forecast uncertainty.  
  In short, we think we have gone some way to resolving the apparent paradox we 
highlighted earlier, whereby agents appear to be able to read policy quite well and yet report 
themselves as uncertain about what central banks (especially the Bundesbank and now the ECB) 
are doing. Agents’ greater difficulty in understanding Bundesbank/ECB policy as expressed in 
surveys, may reflect their higher degree of uncertainty, as shown in the cross sectional data 
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